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COMMENTARY
ADMISSION UPON DIPLOMA TO THE WISCONSIN
BAR
Membership in the bar is
a privilege burdened with
conditions.'
Since the bar was first organized the nature and extent of the
"conditions" referred to by Justice Cardozo have been the subject
of ongoing debate and controversy. The "conditions" currently
imposed by the various jurisdictions for admission to the bar are
either a written examination or upon motion to the jurisdiction's
highest appellate court. Admission upon motion entails satisfying
the jurisdiction's requirements for reciprocity or diploma privilege
should either method be recognized. In Wisconsin, all of the above
"conditions" for admission to the practice of law are recognized
and the authority to evaluate whether an applicant has met the
requisites for admission is solely vested in the appellate court.2
The purpose of regulating bar admission is to ensure that courts
have the assistance of advocates of ability, learning and sound
character as well as to protect the public from incompetent and
dishonest practitioners.3 While the purpose of bar admission regu-
lation cannot be questioned, the means of assuring that bar mem-
bers are of high character and ability frequently occasions lively
discussion and periodic re-evaluation of admission practices and
procedures.'
The dialogue concerning admission procedures has, in many
areas, turned into controversy and this is attributable, in no small
part, to the increasing number and greater mobility of law gradu-
1. In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917). The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has concurred in Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 237, 102 N.W.2d 404, 408
(1960) stating: "The practice of law is not a right but a privilege subject to regulation."
2. See State ex rel. State Bar v. Keller, 16 Wis. 2d 377, 114 N.W.2d 796 (1961) and
Wis. STAT. § 256.28 (1971).
3. Cf Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
4. See, e.g., Bingaman, Illinois' Bar Examination: Time for a 75 Year Overhaul, 60 ILL.
BAR. J. 129 (1971); Report of the Special Committee on Bar Examination, 51 MICH. BAR
J. 724 (Nov., 1972); Steininger, The Diploma Privilege-Recent Developments, 47 WIs. BAR
BULL. 14 (April, 1974); Bussey, Bar Examinations: A Black Perspective, NATIONAL BAR
EXAMINER 12 (Fall, 1973); Kestin, The Bar Examination: A Trial By Ordeal, NATIONAL
BAR EXAMINER 37 (Fall, 1972); Comment, Report of the Pennsylvania Bar Admissions
Procedures, 44 TEMPLE L.Q. 146 (1971); 3 American Bar Association Legal Education
Newsletter (Oct., 1971).
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ates.5 The pressure of increased applicants has intensified the scru-
tiny and re-evaluation of state admission procedures and has led
to a "soul searching" among members of the bar concerning just
how admissions should be conducted. Evincing the contemporary
climate for change in bar admission procedures have been recent
proposals for universal diploma privilege, denouncements of bar
examinations, the institution of the multi-state bar examination,6
and challenges to the use of limited diploma privilege. The most
recent challenge contesting the use of diploma privilege was
Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court7 brought in Montana's fed-
eral district court.
Huffman and its precursor, Goetz v. Harrison,8 were constitu-
tional challenges to Montana's admission practice under its "di-
ploma privilege" statute.' Both cases challenged this statute which
permitted graduates of the state law school admission to the bar
without taking the annual bar examination. The petitioners in both
cases were residents of Montana who had graduated from out-of-
state law schools and were denied admission to the Montana bar
by the Montana Supreme Court when they sought to be admitted
upon motion. The ensuing suits sought to have the "diploma privi-
lege" provision of the Montana Code declared unconstitutional as
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.
The Montana Supreme Court in Goetz held that the admission of
graduates of the state law school to the bar without requiring them
to take a test is reasonable and did not constitute a denial of equal
protection to those who attended out-of-state law schools.10
5. See York and Hale, Too Many Lawyers? The Legal Services Industry: Its Structure
and Outlook, 26 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1973); See also 42 BAR EXAMINER 128 (No. 1, 1973); 38
BAR EXAMINER 108 (No. 3, 1969). Between 1960 and 1972 the law school enrollment has
more than doubled.
6. See, e.g., Bell, Do Bar Examinations Serve a Useful Purpose, 57 A.B.A.J. 1215
(Dec., 1971); Gleisner & Bailey, Why is the Bar Examination Necessary?, THE STUDENT
LAWYER 6 (Dec., 1973); Griswold, In Praise of Bar Examinations!, 47 FLA. BAR J. 644
(Nov., 1973); Covington, The Multistate Bar Examination Program, 42 BAR EXAMINER 5,
95, 154 (1972); Covington, The Multistate Bar Examination, NATIONAL BAR EXAMINER 9
(Fall, 1972); Covington, The Multistate Bar Examination, NATIONAL BAR EXAMINER 18
(Fall, 1973); Pock, The Case Against the Objective Multistate Bar Examination, 25 J.
LEGAL ED. 66 (1966); Comment, Admission to the Pennsylvania Bar: The Need for Sweep-
ing Change, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 945 (1970).
7. 372 F. Supp. 1175 (D.C. Mont., 1974). The petitioner exercised his automatic right
of appeal to the United States Supreme Court and in a summary action the Court affirmed
without consideration on the merits. 43 Law Week 3247 (Oct. 29, 1974).
8. 154 Mont. 274, 462 P.2d 891 (1969).
9. REV. C. MONT. § 93-2002 (1947). In addition to Montana and Wisconsin, West
Virginia and Mississippi are the only other jurisdictions that allow admission upon diploma.
10. The court noted, inter alia, that the standards of both pre-legal and legal study are
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Huffman, a case of first impression in the federal courts, pre-
sented a similar issue regarding the criteria a state may adopt for
admission to the bar. James L. Huffman, a Montana resident and
graduate of the University of Chicago Law School, after being
denied admission on motion to the Montana bar, brought this
action in the United States District Court for Montana challenging
the constitutionality of Montana's diploma privilege statute. A
three judge panel was convened and considered Huffman's request
to restrain the defendant Montana Supreme Court from imple-
menting that portion of section 93-2002, Revised Codes of Mon-
tana, which excepts Montana graduates from taking the bar exam-
ination. Further relief was sought in the form of a mandatory
injunction ordering the Montana Supreme Court to admit the peti-
tioner to the bar upon motion. In sum, the district court was urged
to declare Montana's statutorily enacted "diploma privilege" vio-
lative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court, in a two-one decision, found no arbitrary classification
created by the statute working to deny the petitioner equal protec-
tion under the law.
The court held that the classification inherent in the Montana
statute, which necessarily distinguishes between those attending the
state law school and those who don't, could not be considered a
"suspect" classification. The court also failed to find interference
with the petitioner's "fundamental rights" as freedom of speech,
right to vote and of interstate travel. The issue the court felt com-
pelled to determine was whether there existed any rational justifi-
cation for the existence of the diploma privilege in Montana." The
court reasoned that the object of the classification under scrutiny
created by 93-2002, R.C.M., is to ensure that the courts and people
of Montana are represented by attorneys of sound ethical charac-
ter and competent legal skills. After delineating the curriculum at
the University of Montana Law School and noting the Montana
higher for graduates of the Montana Law School than required of the applicants for the
bar examination and that the small size of the school and its proximity to the Montana
Supreme Court allow the justices to personally gauge the school's graduates. 154 Mont. at
-, 462 P.2d at 895.
11. The court relied upon Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239
wherein the high court stated:
A state can require high standards of qualifications, such as good moral character
or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualifica-
tion must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to
practice law.
1974]
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Supreme Court's supervision of the school, the court went on to
say that "this classification is reasonably related to the object of
ensuring a competent and ethical bar."'' 2
In his dissenting opinion Judge East seized upon the asserted
inhibition of the petitioner's "fundamental right" to interstate
travel as his basis for calling the diploma privilege unconstitu-
tional. Judge East reasoned as follows:
• .* [Sbo here the requirement of the Bar examination is a state
imposed burden upon the plaintiff's exercise of his right to fully
travel to Montana and receive equal treatment with other resi-
dents in like standing under the laws of that state.
I cannot escape the fact that the plaintiff, who holds the same
academic qualifications required by Rule XXV [Montana Su-
preme Court] as do graduates of the Montana Law School is
penalized and burdened under the statutory scheme in the exer-
cise of his constitutional right to freely travel and apply for a
license to practice law on equal footing.
The full thrust of the rationale and holding of Dunn ...
authorizes the flat statement that the statutory requirement of a
Bar examination forces a resident graduate of an out of Montana
American Bar Association approved law school who wishes to
travel to Montana to choose between the exercise of his basic
right to travel and his basic right to receive equal treatment in
lawful pursuits under the laws of Montana with other resident
graduates of an in Montana American Bar Association approved
law school. Absent a compelling state interest, a state may not
burden the right to travel in this way. Manifestly, Montana has
failed to show herein a 'compelling state interest' in justification
of the burden placed upon the plaintiff. 3
The majority bluntly responded to Judge East's dissent by find-
ing that the diploma privilege in no way impinged upon the peti-
tioner's established residence in Montana, or his right to leave or
return to the state. Thus they found discussion of interstate travel
misplaced in the case at bar. In concluding the majority stated:
To summarize, it could not be seriously argued that a state
might without being guilty of invidious discrimination determine
the areas of law in which a bar applicant should be proficient and
also the degree of proficiency which should be attained. Apart
from the fact that the University of Montana Law School's re-
quirements more nearly match the areas of law deemed impor-
12. 372 F. Supp. at 1179.
13. Id. at 1186.
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tant in Montana by the court (as indicated by Rule IV B6 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court) than do the requirements of the
University of Chicago Law School, the more important fact re-
mains that from its relationships with the law school and from
its experience with the graduates of that school, who comprise
the greater part of the Montana Bar, the Court can empirically
determine whether the breadth of the legal education of the Mon-
tana Law School measures up to the Court's expectations and
whether the graduates do in fact have the requisite proficiency.
The fact that as to one set of graduates the Court from its per-
sonal experience has a basis of confidence in the breadth and
quality of its legal education, which from personal experience it
cannot have as to another set, is ample reason for discriminating
between the two. 4
Perhaps the Huffman decision is but a revived beginning rather
than a definitive end to the seemingly endless controversy sur-
rounding diploma privilege. Certainly Huffman along with Goetz
can be viewed as typifying the contemporary questioning and chal-
lenging of bar admission procedures generally.1 5 The Huffman de-
cision, itself, is less than monolithic. Both the court's opinion and
dissent muddy the waters of the diploma privilege controversy that
previously could best be described as murky and vague. Because
such an amorphous decision was rendered it is unfortunate that the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the federal court in a per
curiam order without rendering an opinion.'"S
The emotions raised on both sides of the diploma privilege
controversy are not unlike those surrounding any conflict involving
questions of policy which directly affect individuals. The intensity,
however, has been heightened in recent years and led down stormy
new paths. 6 The dearth of writing on the background of diploma
privilege, coupled with increased controversy about its merits,
makes comment in a clarifying manner on Wisconsin's unique use
of diploma privilege appropriate. In addition, there is little doubt
that bar examinations have become institutionalized and, in fact,
14. Id. at 1183.
15. See. e.g., Comment, Bar Examination: Good Moral Character and Political
Inquiry, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 471; Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wodman,
401 U.S. 154 (1970).
15.1. Note 7, supra.
16. Indeed, it seems that disparaging the use of diploma privilege has become somewhat
of a cause celebre among some supporters of bar examinations. See Griswold, In Praise of
Bar Examinations!, 60 A.B.A.J. 81 (Jan., 1974); 62 ILL. BAR J. 442 (April, 1974); 47 FLA.
BAR J. 644 (Nov., 1973).
1974]
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are administered in every state and the District of Columbia.1 7 It
makes little sense, therefore, to advocate their elimination as have
proponents of universal diploma privilege. Rather, it is hoped that
a reasoned essay on Wisconsin's successful application of limited
diploma privilege will render it better appreciated and understood
to those who would myopically challenge its continued existence.
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
The recognized excellence of Wisconsin law is no accident and
reflects not only upon a forthright supreme court but upon the state
bar as well. The keystone, of course, to a solidly structured bar is
the quality of the state's admission procedures. Wisconsin limits
the practice of law, in all courts of record, to those who have first
obtained a license.' 8 A person seeking to practice as an attorney is
duly licensed by taking an oath pursuant to section 256.29, Wis-
consin Statutes, before the supreme court. A person can qualify to
take the oath in one of three manners as follows: 9
17. Stevens, BAR EXAMINATION COVERAGE, LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA AND THE
APPLICANT, A.A.L.S. BAR EXAMINATION STUDY PROJECT MEMORANDUM No. 9, 12-14
(1970).
18. WIS. STAT. § 256.30 (1971).
19. Section 256.28, Wis. STAT., states:
No person shall be admitted or licensed to practice law in this state, including
appearing before any court, except in the following manner:
(1) ADMISSION ON LAW DIPLOMA, LIST OF LAW SCHOOLS. (a) Every person 21
years of age or over and of good moral character who is a citizen of the United
States, a resident of this state and a graduate of a law school in this state which law
school at the time of his graduation was approved by the American bar association,
as shown by the record of the clerk of the supreme court, and who has met the
requirements of sub. (1)(b) shall be admitted to practice law in this state by the
supreme court and, when such court is not in session, by one of the justices thereof,
by an order signed by such justice and filed with the clerk of said court.
(b) To be admitted on the diploma privilege, every applicant must present to
the clerk of the supreme court his diploma and a certificate of the law school at which
he completed his formal law studies, showing the courses completed and the semester
credits earned and stating that according to the official academic records of such
school the applicant has satisfactorily completed at least the minimum of legal
studies required for the first degree in law and the total semester hours were not less
than 84; and such studies included not less than 60 semester hours of accredited
study, satisfactorily completed in regular courses having as their primary and direct
subject matters the study of rules and principles of substantive and procedural law
as they may arise in the courts and administrative agencies of the United States and
this state in the areas generally known as: administrative law, appellate practice and
procedure, commercial transactions, conflict of laws, constitutional law, contracts,
corporations, creditors' rights, criminal law and procedure, damages, domestic rela-
tions, equity, evidence, future interests, insurance, jurisdiction of courts, labor law,
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legislation, ethics and legal responsibility of the profession, partnership, personal
property, pleading and practice, public utilities, quasi-contracts, real property, taxa-
tion, torts, trade regulation, trusts, and wills and estates. There shall be included in
such minimum not less than 30 semester hours covering the following subject mat-
ters: constitutional law, contracts, criminal law and procedure, evidence, jurisdiction
of courts, ethics and legal responsibilities of the legal profession, pleading and prac-
tice, real property, torts, wills and estates. These requirements may be satisfied by
combinations of the curricular courses, and the dean of each law school in Wisconsin
shall file with the clerk of supreme court upon its request a certified statement setting
forth the courses taught in his law school which are accredited for a first degree in
law and the percentage of the time devoted in each course to the subject matter of
the areas of law required by this rule for eligibility to admission on the diploma
privilege. In addition to these requirements a law school may require other courses
or practical training, for which credit toward a degree may or may not be given, as
a prerequisite to its certification of eligibility for admission on the diploma privilege.
(c) The clerk of the supreme court shall compile a record of all law schools
which are approved by the American bar association, with the date of such approval
and those which are not approved; and such record so compiled shall constitute an
official record of the supreme court, and proof of the fact that the law schools therein
stated as approved by the American bar association were so approved at the times
therein stated.
(2) ADMISSION ON CERTIFICATE OF BAR COMMISSIONERS. Every person 21 years
of age or over and of good moral character who is a citizen of the United States
and a resident of this state and a graduate of any law school which at the time of
his graduation was approved by the American bar association shown by the record
of the clerk of the supreme court shall upon the production of the certificate of the
board of state bar commissioners, be admitted to practice law in this state by the
supreme court, and when such court is not in session, by one of the justices, by an
order signed by such justice and filed with the clerk of said court. A certificate shall
be given by the board of state bar commissioners to every person who successfully
passes an examination given by the board of state bar commissioners covering all
or part of the subject matter in the areas of law listed in sub. (1)(b).
(3) ADMISSION ON PROOF OF PRACTICE ELSEWHERE. Every person 21 years of
age or over and of good moral character who is a citizen of the United States and a
resident of of this state and who shall have been admitted to practice law in any other
state or states or territory, or the District of Columbia, may be admitted to practice
law in this state by the supreme court upon motion, or, when the court is not in
session, by one of the justices thereof, after filing with the clerk of the supreme court
(1) his written application therefor, (2) a certificate of his admission to practice law
by a court of last resort in such other state or territory or the District of Columbia
and (3) satisfactory proof that he is a citizen of the United States and a resident of
this state, is of good moral character, and has been engaged in actual practice in such
other state or states or territory or the District of Columbia or in the courts of the
United States for 5 years within the last 8 years prior to filing his application,
exclusive in each case of time spent in the armed forces. The certificate of the judge
of any court of record in such other state or territory or the District of Columbia or
court of the United States, before whom such applicant has practiced, under the seal
of such court, may be deemed sufficient proof of such practice in such state or
territory or the District of Columbia or court of the United States.
(4) SERVICE COUNTED AS PRACTICE OF LAW. Service as judge of a court of
record of any state or territory or the District of Columbia or of the United States,
service in any department of the United States government including service in the
armed forces determined by the supreme court to be actual legal service, and teach-
ing in any law school which is approved by the American bar association, may be
1974]
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(1) Upon the strength of a diploma through graduation from
a law school within Wisconsin, which at the time of graduation,
was approved by the American Bar Association, as shown by the
record of the clerk of the supreme court and which graduate has
followed the procedural and curricular guidelines set out in section
256.28(1)(b), Wisconsin Statutes;
(2) If a graduate of any law school which was American Bar
Association approved at graduation, upon the presentation of a
certificate issued by the board of state bar commissioners which
certificate is issued upon successfully passing the bar examination
administered by the commissioner pursuant to section 256.28(2),
Wisconsin Statutes;
(3) By having been admitted to practice in the court of last
resort of any other state, United States territory or in the District
of Columbia and having actually practiced in that jurisdiction dur-
ing five of the preceding eight years. In addition all three methods,
examination, diploma and reciprocity re.quire that the applicant to
the bar be a United States citizen and Wisconsin resident, be of
good moral character, and have attained majority."0
It is not generally appreciated that Wisconsin bar admission
procedures date back to the state's territorial era. From Wiscon-
sin's inclusion in-the territorial organization known as the North-
west Ordinance in 1787 to the Civil War, admission to the bar has
been characterized as being "marked by legislative see-sawing be-
tween control and decontrol. ' 21 Since the Civil War and especially
1885 there has been an increased development of and resulting
deemed to be actual practice of law for the purpose of sub. (3) and such law teaching
or such legal service performed in this state as well as in such other state or states
or territory or District of Columbia will be counted under the 5 and 8 years' test
provided in sub. (3).
20. Section 4 of Rule 2 of the State Bar Rules as adopted by the supreme court at 53
Wis. 2d xi (1972) further states:
Only active members may practice law. No individual other than an enrolled
active member of the State Bar shall practice law in this state or in any manner hold
himself out as authorized or qualified to practice law. A judge in this state may allow
a nonresident counsel to appear in his court and participate in a particular action or
proceeding in association with an active member of the State Bar of Wisconsin who
appears and participates in such action or proceeding. Permission to such nonresi-
dent lawyer can be withdrawn by the judge granting it if such a lawyer by his conduct
manifests incompetency to represent a client in a Wisconsin court or his unwilling-
ness to abide by the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Decorum
of the court.
21. Rice, Admission to the Practice of Law in the Courts of Wisconsin, 4 Wis. L. REv.
65, 66 (1927).
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vigilance through statutes and supreme court rules regulating ad-
mission to the bar.22
The government of the Northwest Territory, through exercise
of its legislative powers, first regulated the practice of law in "the
territory of the United States Northwest of the River Ohio" by a
statute dated August 1, 1792. This statute, which made political
loyalty and passing an examination administered by a territorial
judge prerequisite to practicing law, was soon replaced with a
stricter statute in 1798.2 For approximately the next three and
one-half decades there is no evidence of the enforcement or even
existence of laws regulating admission to the bar. It was not until
Wisconsin became an independent territory, in 1836, that the
state's most exacting statute prior to the institution of a formal bar
examination was enacted; however, it too was short lived.24
Soon after statehood in 1848 the legislature opened the bar to
all citizens regardless of training or ability by declaring that every
court should admit to practice before it any state resident of good
moral character.2 5 More realistic legislation, which for the most
part codified existing practice, was passed in 1861 and has since
been modified into the present day section 256.28, Wisconsin Stat-
utes.2 1 Provisions of the original statute limited the practice of law
to those applicants who could demonstrate their knowledge and
ability in an open court examination conducted by a circuit judge
or his appointed examiners.2?
22. Id.
23. Id. at 67. The statute passed in 1798 required, inter alia, at least four years of legal
study in a practitioner's office within the territory. The requirement lasted only two years
until 1800 when Wisconsin became part of the then created Indiana territory. Id.
24. Id. at 68. This statute, which lasted two years, contained requirements of citizenship,
residence, good moral character, professional study and provisions for disbarment.
25. R.S. 1849, ch. 87 § 26. While this provision endured until 1859 when repealed it is
apparent in the following excerpt from Motion of Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 240 (1875) that
the courts never implemented it:
We do not understand that the circuit courts generally yielded to the unwise and
unseemly act of 1849, which assumed to force upon the courts as attorneys, any
persons of good moral character, however unlearned or even illiterate; however
disqualified, by nature, education, or habit, for the important trusts of the profession.
We learn from the clerk of this court that no application under that statute was ever
made here. The good sense of the legislature long since led to its repeal.
26. Wis. Laws 1861, ch. 89.
27. Until the institution of the board of law examiners in 1885 at least some of the in-
court examinations as to technical ability were of rather dubious quality. The following is
an excerpt from the 1923 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK at 416:
The examinations given were sometimes very much of a farce and were occasion-
ally passed by as being a mere formality. It is said that the only question asked an
1974]
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By virtue of chapter 79 of the Laws of 1870 graduates of the
newly opened law department of the University of Wisconsin were
admitted to the bar upon presentation of a certification of gradua-
tion.2 1 With the initiation of formal legal education came the insti-
tution of the "diploma privilege". This was probably a distinct
improvement in an era where admission to the bar may well have
been obtained by advising the examiner where to eat.2" By 1881 at
least two years of study in the law department at Madison were
required for graduation and eligibility under the diploma privilege
statute.3 1 Indeed, admission to the bar via study at Madison must
have been considered formidable when compared to the informal
administration of in-court examinations as an alternative entree to
the bar.
Until 1885 what semblance there was of a "law examination"
varied as the number of judges who administered them. No uni-
form standard by which to measure an applicant's learning or
ability existed and naturally the ideas of the circuit judges as to
what was "sufficient learning in the law" varied greatly. Eighteen-
eighty-five saw the institution of a formalized written bar examina-
tion and the establishment of a "board of examiners for the exami-
nation of applicants for admission to the bar. 3 1 This also was an
obvious improvement in admission procedure for it presented a
standardized examination for all aspirants to the bar. Equally im-
portant, eligibility for taking the examination was conditioned
upon the completion of two years of legal study. There was, how-
applicant upon one occasion was 'Where can you get the best oyster stew?' Upon
leading the judge and a few friends to the place and paying the bill, he was admitted
without further formality. The natural result of such a procedure was that persons
were sometimes admitted to the practice of law who were incompetent and un-
trustworthy.
28. The law department began in 1868 and graduated its first class in 1869. Marquette
University Law School, whose predecessor institution was established in 1894, was not
accorded the diploma privilege until 1933 and in fact opposed it. See note 45, infra.
According to one author the purpose of the legislation creating the diploma privilege
was to "attract students to Madison who were flocking to Michigan." Fox, Diploma Privi-
lege in Wisconsin, 11 MARQ. L. REV. 71 (1926). Another plausible reason may have been
the advantage of any formal training over the minimal amount required to pass the in-court
examination.
29. See note 27, supra and Shaw, Should a Law Diploma Admit to the Bar?, 1 AM.
LAW SCHOOL REV. 196 (1902).
30. See note 21, supra at 73. In 1894 the course was extended to three years where it
remains today.
31. Wis. Laws 1885, ch. 63. The examination was required of all who were not admitted
as graduates of Madison or under reciprocity.
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ever, no delineation as to the quality or content of this study which
presumably could have been done in a law office.
Thus the upgrading of admission procedures and requirements
in Wisconsin was led by the establishment of a law department at
Madison and the implementation of diploma privilege for its grad-
uates. The bar examination could be viewed as a stop-gap measure
to assure at least some parity between the Madison trained gradu-
ates and those of less comparable training. The impetus, then, for
a uniform bar examination was not to test the law school graduates
but those with less desirable training. It may well be that the bar
examination was considered the less rigorous route to membership
in the legal profession. The preference for obtaining formal legal
training was further stressed by chapter 174 of the Laws of 1897
wherein the legislature adopted an expanded diploma privilege.
This chapter authorized the admission of graduates of any "law
school of any other state or territory which shall be accredited as
a school of equal standing as the college of law of the University
of Wisconsin by the board of examination for admission to the bar
of this state." This provision existed until 1903 when it was re-
pealed ostensibly as a result of the board of examiners' reluctance
to determine the standing of foreign law schools.3" Since 1903 the
diploma privilege has continued to admit graduates of Madison
and since 1933 graduates of Marquette University Law School.3
According to William G. Rice, Jr.:
The year 1903 was marked by a considerable raising of law
training standards by the legislature, by the supreme court, and
by the university [of Wisconsin]. Not only did the Statute of 1903
. . . restore the earlier attitude towards school and institutions
not under state control, but it raised the period of prerequisite
law study to three years. Moreover, it obligated the supreme
court to make from time to time such regulations as it might
deem desirable as to the course of study, standard of require-
ments, and examination, of applicants.34
The emphasis on formal legal education occasioned changes in
32. Wis. Laws 1903, ch. 19 §§ 1-3. See also note 21, supra at 76, n. 28.
A recent bill to amend section 256.28 which would allow the admission of graduates of
all law schools regardless of accreditation status was proposed to the legislature by Assem-
bly Bill 188 introduced January 23, 1973. This bill was refused to pass pursuant to Assembly
Joint Resolution 13 on October 26, 1973.
33. Wis. Laws 1933, ch. 60. See also In re Admission of Certain Persons to the Bar of
the State of Wisconsin, 211 Wis. 337, 247 N.W. 877 (1933).
34. See note 21, supra at 77.
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admission standards at Madison which, according to then Dean
Harry S. Richards, "resulted from a movement on the part of
members of the bar throughout the country to raise the standards
of the legal profession by exacting higher entrance requirements,
longer periods of study, and better preliminary education."35 The
ever exacting criteria for attainment of a law diploma from Madi-
son consistently outpaced the other methods for entrance to the bar
well into the twentieth century. A person who could not meet the
requisites for graduation from Madison was relegated to sitting for
the bar examination or entering the bar through reciprocity. 6 As
late as 1926 the following statement could be made summing up
the admission procedure to then:
It may be asked why the state law school should make a greater
demand for its degree than the legislature and the supreme court
make for admittance to practice. But this is a question which
might with equal relevancy have been asked at any time in the
sixty years of the law school's history, for its requirements have
habitually been stricter than those of the legislature and courts.
Certain requirements of the latter such as citizenship and resi-
dence, have never found place in the school. But the educational
standards have almost continuously been most severe ...
[W]hile the state continues to entrust to the school the control
of one avenue of admittance to the practice, and while full-time
law school study remains only one of the avenues, the school may
well maintain a standard, at least for regular students, which,
beyond satisfying the state's requirements for professional prepa-
ration, will fulfill the state's other requirement of educational
excellence in its university.37
35. Id. at 78.
36. It is interesting to note that entrance via the bar examination was not considered
the most inferior method of admittance from the standpoint of preparation, but rather
reciprocity was. By Wis. Laws 1911, ch. 196 the requirement of practice in another state
was lengthened from three years to five out of the preceding eight years which it remains
today. This change was proposed by the board of examiners who were aware of persons
leaving Wisconsin to practice for three years in other states where the standards of admis-
sion were lower and then returning to practice in Wisconsin. See note 21, supra at 79, n.
41.
37. Id. at 85. This statement remains substantially unchanged. Section 256.28, Wis.
STAT., requires that applicants for the bar examination have graduated from an American
Bar Association approved law school. Under A.B.A. Standard 305, APPROVAL Ov LAW
SCHOOLS: STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE, the academic requirement of 1200 class
hours is surpassed by both Marquette and Madison. In fact, out of a list of 115 approved
law schools only 25 require as many credit-hours as the two law schools. See note 17, supra
at 19-31.
Additionally, both schools require a four year bachelors degree earned from an ac-
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The emphasis in Wisconsin has clearly been to foster education
at in-state institutions whose graduates become members of the bar
by virtue of their training. Those entering the Wisconsin bar via
the diploma privilege were and continue to be among the best
prepared in the country. The bar examination's traditional purpose
has been to regulate those with less comparable training." it has
only been in recent years that bar examinations have reached their
ascendancy and become the raison d'etre for admissions in many
states. Indeed, the importance of the bar examination has become
somewhat misplaced as the following remark by Laurence De
Muth, in reference to the American Bar Association's 1921 whole-
sale adoption of bar examinations as the sole criteria for admis-
sions, indicates:
I have frequently wondered why the decision was as it was, that
the practicing members of the bar would administer what is now
so familarly known as the bar examination to candidates for
admission, when the real purpose of our venture into this field
from the standpoint of the American Bar Association was to set
standards of legal education so that we could be assured that the
law schools of this country were turning out men who were capa-
ble of being admitted to the bar. 9
In an earlier national symposium on the respective merits of
bar examinations and the diploma privilege, Dean Leon Green of
the Northwestern Law School also placed a premium on legal
education. When commenting on whether the existence and/or
improvement of bar examinations had improved admission stan-
dards, Green said:
It is a fact that improvement has been made in bar examination
credited college or university which is not required under A.B.A. Rule 502. Both institutions
are and have been for over fifty years members of the American Association of Law Schools
which exacts higher standards of its members than A.B.A. accreditation standards. See
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL BULLETIN, 1974-1975 and UNIVERSITY OF WISCON-
SIN LAW SCHOOL ANNOUNCEMENTS, 1974-1975.
It should also be noted that two of the remaining three state schools in the country that
still have the diploma privilege were cited as being national leaders, along with Madison,
in toughening standards for earning a degree; they were West Virginia and Montana. See
note 21, supra at 84.
38. Statutory language requiring an applicant to the bar examination to have graduated
from an ABA accredited law school did not appear until 1971. See Supreme Court Order,
48 Wis. 2d vii (1971).
39. 18 BAR EXAMINER 236, 237 (1949). Part of the opening remarks delivered as moder-
ator of a panel discussion on diploma privilege before the national conference of bar
examiners.
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technique and also the examiners in most states are giving re-
markable devotion to their work. But I doubt that improvement
in bar examinations or any refinement in examination technique
is of any great professional significance. I am inclined to think
that the improvement in admission standards which have counted
are the higher requirements for admission to law school and the
steady strengthening of law schools themselves. These have come
about as the result of a slow, tedious, jockeying process initiated
by a few leaders of the bar and carried through by bar association
committees supported by some of the courts and quite generally
supported by the universities."
Dean H. Claude Horack of Duke University Law School had
this to say as a participant in the same symposium with Dean
Green:
The raising of the educational requirements in most states to
comply with the standards set by the American Bar Association
has undoubtedly brought a better quality of applicant to the bar
examinations but that the bar examinations have done much to
encourage a better type of legal education in law schools is
doubtful. Most bar examiners sincerely believe that they are
weeding out those unfit or those unprepared to practice law, but
the success of the 'repeaters' in most states seems to show that
persistence rather than legal talent is the basis upon which admis-
sion may be finally gained."
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The use of diploma privilege in Wisconsin has not been without
its detractors. In 1921 the report of a special committee on legal
education and admission to the bar was presented at the annual
American Bar Association convention in Cincinnati. As a result of
the committee's report the delegates adopted the following resolu-
tion:
The American Bar Association is of the opinion that gradua-
tion from a law school should not confer the right of admission
to the bar, and that every candidate should be subjected to an
examination by public authority to determine his fitness."
In 1924 the Wisconsin Bar Association adopted the American
Bar Association resolutions pertaining to admission to the practice
40. Why Bar Examinations?, 33 ILL. L. REV. 908 (1939).
41. Id. at 891.
42. 46 REPORT OF AMERICAN BAR ASS'N 679, 688 (1921).
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of law.43 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, failed to en-
tirely adopt these recommendations and the diploma privilege was
kept." The supreme court recognized that conformity with general
proclamations does not generally make the best policy and by
retaining the diploma privilege has voiced confidence in the state's
two law schools.45
Recently, it has been suggested that the existence of the di-
ploma privilege in Wisconsin is "due more to inertia rather than a
well thought out program to secure its adoption."" Given the his-
torical analysis this comment may be applicable to the period since
the 1930s. This is not to suggest, however, that the diploma privi-
lege has gone unquestioned during the past forty years. Since 1931
there have been more than a dozen statutory changes effected by
the legislature and supreme court rulings with the most recent
changes being a supreme court order dated June 8, 1973.11 In addi-
tion, there have been periodic reviews by the supreme court con-
cerning the merits of retaining the diploma privilege."
In June of 1954 the House of Governors of the Wisconsin Bar
Association at its annual meeting in Eau Claire, Wisconsin, passed
the following resolution:
43. In sum, the ABA recommended the abolition of the diploma privilege requiring bar
examinations as well as graduation from a law school having:
(1) The admission requirement of at least two years of study in a college;
(2) The graduation requirement of;
(a) if a full-time school; study for three academic years, or
(b) if a part-time school; a longer course equivalent in the number of work-
ing hours;
(3) An adequate library;
(4) Teachers giving entire .time to the school. The school not being operated as a
commercial enterprise, nor salaries of teachers depend upon the number of students.
Wisconsin statutory requirements and the University of Wisconsin had specified the aca-
demic requirements listed since 1890. See note 30, supra and accompanying text.
44. See 190 Wis. v-viii (1926).
45. At least two Marquette faculty members went on record as opposing the extension
of diploma privilege to the school's graduates in an article by Professors Zollman and Fox
entitled Diploma Privilege in Wisconsin, 11 MARQ. L. REv. 73 (1926) wherein they con-
cluded:
• ..Marquette University. . .recognizes fully the consequences on the morale of
both its faculty and its student body of the extension of [diploma] privilege to it and
far from desiring it will oppose with all legitimate means within its power the receipt
of such a 'gift of the Greeks!' Id. at 78.
46. Steininger, The Diploma Privilege - Recent Developments, 47 Wis. BAR BULL. 14
(April, 1974).
47. See 59 Wis. 2d vii (1973).
48. A brief was filed at the supreme court's request by the Marquette Law School as
recently as 1969 wherein proposed revisions of bar admission rules and procedures were
extensively discussed.
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BE IT RESOLVED that the standing committee on Legal Edu-
cation and Bar Admission study the question of whether or not
candidates for admission to the Bar should be required to take a
Bar examination regardless of whether they are a graduate of a
State Law School and a report thereon be made at the next
meeting of the Association.
The result was a thorough study of the Wisconsin admission proce-
dures under the chairmanship of Professor James D. Ghiardi." The
approach this committee took was to determine whether or not the
diploma privilege as it exists in Wisconsin is detrimental to the
training and education of lawyers at the Marquette and Wisconsin
law schools."
The committee held in favor of retention of the diploma priv-
ilege as it existed in Wisconsin." It concluded that even though
"..*. there is room for improvement in the present method of
educating and training lawyers in Wisconsin, the elimination of
the diploma privilege would in no way improve education but
would, in all probability, hinder such education under present
circumstances." 52
A compendium of the committee's findings follows:
In support of continuation of the diploma privilege Mr. W.
Wade Boardman, then president of the Board of Bar Commission-
ers, stated:
(1) That a good law school faculty is in a better position to
test and evaluate an applicant's qualifications for the practice of
law than is an examining board.
(2) That a change in the present diploma privilege might very
readily result in a lowering of standards of the present bar exami-
nation and that it would greatly increase the cost of administration,
which cost would in all probability be borne by the legal profession
in the form of an annual license fee.
(3) It would lower the present teaching standards of both law
schools by requiring an undue emphasis on bar examination prepa-
ration.
(4) That no evidence exists that the standard of legal educa-
49. See 28 Wis. BAR BULL. 33 (April, 1955) and Report of Legal Education & Bar
Admissions Committee of the Wisconsin Bar Association-On the Diploma Privilege as it
Exists in Wisconsin, which is on file in the office of the Dean, Marquette University Law
School.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 43.
52. Id. at 44.
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tion in Wisconsin has been lowered because of the diploma privi-
lege, but rather the evidence points to the fact that Wisconsin
stands high nationally, both in legal education and in professional
competency.
(5) That there has been no increase in law school attendance
because of the diploma privilege.
Mr. Barney B. Barstow, then a member of the Board of Bar
Commissioners, pointed out:
(1) That the bar examination should not be used as a method
of limiting the number of admissions to the bar, but that it should
be used only to increase professional competency and no evidence
indicates that this can be done better by the bar examination than
by the faculties of the two law schools.
(2) That one of the problems facing the legal profession is the
lack of good moral character on the part of a small number of
lawyers. That this problem can be better met by the law schools
than by the board of bar examiners and would not be solved by
requiring a bar examination.
Dean Oliver S. Rundell of the Wisconsin Law School was of
the opinion that to require Wisconsin students to take the bar
examination "would be a backwards step in what has hitherto been
an encouraging forward movement." 53 He further reiterated his
previously articulated defense of the diploma privilege wherein he
said:
I think that the record produced by a student in a properly
conducted law school program is more effective for the purpose
of determining his professional capacity than a properly con-
ducted bar examination could be. Students in a school are set
tasks to perform and problems to solve under prescribed condi-
tions. They are graded in competition with their fellow students
who have been assigned or like tasks or problems under the same
conditions. Their grades reflect their relative success in perform-
ing their assignment.
A bar examination is framed without any specific relation-
ship to the particular educational background of the individuals
who take it. It must be comprehensive in character and must call
largely for information respecting things everyone is supposed to
know. It necessarily emphasizes memory at the expense of rea-
soning and this is true no matter how conscious an effort is made
to avoid such an emphasis. 4
53. Letter sent to Prof. James D. Ghiardi on October 13, 1954 which is on file in the
office of the Dean, Marquette University Law School.
54. 18 BAR EXAMINER 244 (1949).
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The faculties of the Marquette and Wisconsin law schools pre-
sented the following points in a joint statement favoring the contin-
uation of the diploma privilege in Wisconsin:
(1) That the bar examiners, because of time limitations, can
cover only a limited number of courses and a limited number of
fields and therefore test rote learning ability rather than legal com-
petency.
(2) That the diploma privilege does not unduly increase the
number of lawyers in Wisconsin nor has it unduly increased the
number of law students in the two law schools.
(3) A bar examination would necessarily require curriculum
revision in the law schools and would tend to eliminate some of the
elective courses offered in the schools and thereby impair the pres-
ent high standard of legal education in Wisconsin and emphasize
only those required for the bar.55
(4) The state of Wisconsin has only two fully approved and
accredited day law schools. If the bar examination was required,
marginal law schools would in all probability be organized. Mar-
ginal in the sense that they would meet the minimal statutory
requirements and be aimed entirely at preparation for the bar
examination.
(5) The law schools have endeavored to constantly raise their
standards as to admission, graduation and educational proficiency
by their joint efforts, and in cooperation with the bench and bar.
Should a bar examination be made the final arbiter for admission
to the bar there would be a temptation on the part of the law
schools to admit more students on the theory that the examination
would weed out the unqualified.56
Only three arguments against the diploma privilege were con-
sidered worth discussing by the committee. The most serious re-
sembles the issue raised in Huffman and charges that the diploma
privilege discriminates against graduates of high grade law schools
from other states.17 This argument, when placed upon the constitu-
55. See also note 17, supra at 37.
56. These views were resubstantiated by Dean Seitz of Marquette in 1963 at the request
of then Chief Justice Brown in a letter addressed to him which is on file in the office of the
Dean, Marquette University Law School.
57. The other arguments were that the ABA recommends that every graduate of a law
school take a bar examination and, that a bar examination requires a comprehensive review
of the law and requires a correlation of the courses studied in law school. All of the proffered
arguments were more than adequately countered in the committee's report. See note 49,
supra at 43-44.
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tional ground of denial of equal protection, is formidable but,
nevertheless, has little merit. At first glance this argument seems
inherent in the diploma privilege concept and so obvious that it was
naturally made in Huffman.58 It is made, however, with little or no
appreciation of how diploma privilege works, at least in Wisconsin,
as an admission vehicle.
ADMISSION UPON DIPLOMA
Perhaps the place to start is in the area of semantics rather than
substance. What seems compelling about a Fourteenth Amend-
ment argument based on denial of equal protection evaporates
when a term other than "diploma privilege" is used. Substituting
"diploma requirement" for "diploma privilege" illustrates that a
proper understanding of this admission method is hindered by the
connotation created by the word "privilege". The problem is more
one of conceptualization rather than an intrinsic inadequacy with
this admission device. "Diploma requirement" is a better term to
use in gaining a proper appreciation of the essence of section
256.28(1), Wisconsin Statutes.59
Erroneously, the diploma requirement is sometimes considered
a waiver of the bar examination for preferred candidates, the grad-
uates of in-state law schools." A few moments of reflection will
reveal it to be no such waiver at all, but merely a substitution of
one form of examination for another with different people doing
the examining. The extension of the diploma requirement to a law
school involves a deliberate two-step process by the admitting au-
thority, viz:
(1) A determination by some investigatory means that the ad-
mitting authority is satisfied with the resources, administration,
faculty, and program of the law school; and
(2) A delegation, in consequence thereof, of the examining
function to the faculty of the school instead of the bar examiners.
The diploma requirement, insofar as the first step is concerned,
is a process of accreditation in addition to the normal accreditation
The dialogue concerning the "pros & cons" of diploma privilege is seemingly endless;
for other litanies listing arguments for and against diploma privilege see note 54, supra at
238-239; note 46, supra at 16; note 17, supra at 56-57.
58. See also 51 MICH. BAR J. 724, 726 (Nov., 1972).
59. The statutory language should be changed to reflect this by dropping the over-
worked term "diploma privilege."
60. Again, much of this may be attributed to the use of the word "privilege."
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by the American Bar Association (ABA) and the membership re-
quirements of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS).
But it is not accreditation alone, for it necessarily involves delega-
tion of the examining function to the faculty of the law school to
the same extent as such delegation is accorded to the bar examin-
ers. An understanding of the accreditation-delegation process,
then, is basic to an appreciation to the diploma requirement.
Admitting authority in Wisconsin is the exclusive province of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.61 The supreme court has seen fit to
accredit the state's two law schools in such a fashion that their
students fulfilling the requisites for a diploma are admitted to the
bar upon graduation. 2 Implicit in this accreditation is an aspect
of control over the curriculum as well as standards the school must
maintain. It must be noted, however, that the statutory require-
ment of ABA approval does not mean a law school is accredited
per se for diploma requirement purposes.13 The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court looks for more, especially emphasis on Wisconsin
case and statutory law in the curriculum.
Underlying the equal protection argument there exists the as-
sumption that all J.D. holders receive .an equal legal education if
they graduate from an ABA accredited law school. This makes the
constitutional argument against the diploma requirement seem
more persuasive. Nothing, however, could be further from the
truth. Graduation from an accredited law school is not a common
denominator upon which to construct an equal protection argu-
ment because neither the ABA nor the AALS in their accreditation
procedures dictate curriculum or the subject areas of examination.
The admitting authority accrediting for the diploma requirement
in Wisconsin does consider these factors, and granting the diploma
requirement means satisfaction with the curriculum and examina-
61. See State v. Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441 (1932) and State ex rel. State
Bar v. Keller, 16 Wis. 2d 377, 386, 114 N.W.2d 796, 801 (1961) wherein the court stated:
The admission of a person to practice law is constitutionally an exclusive power of
the court and the attempt to exercise it by the legislature itself (or its agency) is
unconstitutional and void.
62. Wis. STAT. § 256.28(1) (1971).
63. There appears to be no reason, nevertheless, why an out-of-state law school could
not petition the Wisconsin Supreme Court to amend its rule to include that school's gradu-
ates under the diploma requirement extended through its accreditation-delegation process.
It is equally clear, however, that denial of such an application could be justly based on
jurisdictional boundries. This would appear to be a constitutionally sufficient basis for
classification since the burden of continued policing of out of state schools to see if they
maintain the standards required by the court is a valid reason to classify geographically.
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tion policies of ihe law school to which it is extended. The asser-
tion, then, that graduates of ABA and AALS accredited law
schools are equally competent to practice in any particular jurisdic-
tion is nonsensical. The ABA's stamp of approval is not for the
purpose of certifying graduates of a particular school, without
more, to the Wisconsin bar,64 while the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's stamp of approval is precisely for that express purpose. 5
Until out-of-state schools seeking accreditation by Wisconsin sub-
mit to the court's scrutiny their curricula and examination devices,
Wisconsin is incapable of undertaking an even-handed extension of
the diploma requirement beyond its borders. The state cannot rely
upon ABA accreditation or AALS membership to insure an educa-
tional experience or an examination system equal to the standard
set at Wisconsin's law schools. All that can be done is to treat
applicants for the Wisconsin bar from out-of-state schools equally
by subjecting them to the Wisconsin bar examination.
In an interesting symmetry, just as those who claim denial of
equal protection under diploma privilege statutes premise their
attacks by assuming that graduation from an accredited law school
should entitle a person to bar admission anywhere, so do the sup-
porters of universal diploma privilege adopt this same theory. This
notion destroys the concept of state control over the bar admission
process and proceeds upon the assumption that all J.D. programs
are alike and equally qualify graduates for admission in any juris-
diction. Given the present posture of the national accreditation
process, the advocates of a universal diploma privilege stand for
admission to the bar without any control of the admitting authori-
ties over the subject matter of legal education or the examination
process as a preparation for the practice of law. The only requisite
would appear to be the ABA's stamp of approval."6
64. As Homer D. Crotty stated in his study on accreditation:
The primary purpose [of accreditation] is to bring about and also maintain high
educational standards for professional training and service.
The Accreditation of Law Schools, 18 BAR EXAMINER 174 (1950). See also Cardozo,
Accreditation of Law Schools in the United States, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 420 (1966).
65. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Hackin v.
Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499 (9th Cir., 1966); Colorado Polytech. Col. v. State Board, 173 Colo.
39, 476 P.2d 38 (1970); In the Matter of Admission of Attorneys, 29 N.Y.2d 653, 247
N.E.2d 440 (1970) Application of Schatz, 80 Wash. 2d 604, 497 P.2d 153 (1972); In re
Admission of Certain Persons to the Bar, 211 Wis. 337, 247 N.W. 877 (1933).
66. The concept of state control over its admission procedures did not fair well in
Rossiter v. Board of Law Examiners, Civil No. C-4767 (D. Colo., filed June 12, 1973 - on
file in the office of the Dean, Marquette University Law School). Colorado requires that
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Not only is the diploma requirement viewed as an accreditation
device, but as a delegation of the examining function to an ap-
proved law school's faculty. Just as the examining function is dele-
gated to the bar examiners by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, so it
is delegated to the respective faculties of Wisconsin's two law
schools. It is important to keep in mind that the state delegates
examining and recommendation power, not power to admit. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has the power to delegate the qualifying
function of bar applicants to whatever public authority it sees fit
to entrust this function." The Wisconsin Supreme Court has seen
applicants for its bar examination graduate from ABA approved law schools. Rossiter had
attended Western State University Law School which was not ABA approved and thus his
application to take the Colorado bar examination was not accepted. The district court did
not question the supreme court's ability to delegate accreditation power to the ABA but
stated the issue as "whether or not the delegated power is used subject to procedural
safeguards which would guarantee the plaintiff due process of law." The court was of the
opinion that the Colorado procedure violated procedural due process. The court concluded:
The accreditation system here thus works so that one may be deprived of the
opportunity to practice law without ever having had an initial determination as to
whether he meets the conditions upon which the opportunity is premised. This dele-
gation of power without providing the applicant with an opportunity to demonstrate;
at some point, that he has graduated from a school which satisfies the ABA stan-
dards is, we think, a denial of his right to due process of law.
This decision raises a host of problems not the least of which is the unreasonable and
potentially incredible administrative burden that would overwhelm state examining boards.
This fear was voiced by the Washington Supreme Court in Application of Schatz, see note
65, supra, wherein the court stated:
Rules for admission to the bar, are, of course, general in their specifications. They
apply to classes of applicants and are drawn to meet normal conditions. They cannot
very well be tailored to meet the special merits of individuals or individual law
schools. To require the Board of Governors to look into the individual qualifications
and standards of every nonaccredited law school whenever a graduate from that
school applies to take the bar examination would be to impose upon the board an
unreasonable burden.
The district court reasoned that the petitioner should not suffer because the school he
attended has never sought ABA approval. Since Colorado provides no procedure whereby
a graduate of such a law school can be heard on the question of whether his school complies
with the ABA standards the Colorado procedure is unconstitutional. The problem with this
approach is that it is tantamount to placing the burden on the state to seek out and qualify
applicants. There is no rule of constitutional or other law which would compel a state to
act in such an affirmative manner.
This decision can best be described as an anomaly and has been vacated by the United
States Court of Appeals (Civil No. 73-1649, 73-1650, 10th Cir., filed January 10, 1974 - on
file in the office of the Dean, Marquette University Law School) and remanded for trial
before a three-judge panel.
67. See, e.g., Chaney v. State Bar of California, 386 F.2d 962 (9th Cir., 1967); Applica-
tion of Peterson, - Alak. -, 499 P.2d 304 (1972); Application of Feingold, - Me.
-, 296 A.2d 492 (1972). Not all bar examiner's recommendations are followed. See
Application of Courney, 162 Conn. 518, 294 A.2d 569 (1972).
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fit to delegate the examining function to the bar examiners and the
law school faculties. In both respects Wisconsin is in full compli-
ance with the ABA's standard 102 which states:
The American Bar Association believes that every candidate for
admission to the bar should have graduated from a law school
approved by the American Bar Association, that graduation
from a law school should not alone confer the right of admission
to the bar, and that every candidate for admission should be
examined by public authority to determine his fitness for admis-
sion." (Emphasis added)
Nothing in the standard indicates that the "public authority"
must be bar examiners or cannot be a law school faculty. Indeed,
when recommending a candidate to the bar, what "public author-
ity" is in a better position to attest to that person's legal profi-
ciency and good moral character than a law school faculty? The
faith and trust on the part of the supreme court implicit in the
delegation process is the same whether it is placed in a bar commis-
sion or a law school faculty.
Viewed in this manner the way to be thus admitted to practice
in Wisconsin is to be examined by a Wisconsin Supreme Court
delegee of the examining power. 9 This means writing the Wiscon-
sin bar examination or attending one of the Wisconsin law schools
and writing its examinations. The accreditation-delegation process
implicit in the extension of the diploma requirement to a law
school is well within the ambit of the inherent powers of the su- •
preme court, as the sole admitting authority, to qualify applicants
to membership in the bar. Claiming that this procedure results in
a denial of equal protection challenges not so much the diploma
requirement as it does a jurisdiction's right to qualify members of
the bar for admission. 70
CONCLUSION
To conclude that all states should have a limited diploma re-
quirement makes little sense just as concluding that no state
should. The reasons for its success in Wisconsin are largely due to
68. ABA HANDBOOK: APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOL; STANDARDS AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE, 1 (1973). This standard, however, is somewhat at odds with standard 301 (a)
which states:
The law school shall maintain an educational program that is designed to qualify its
graduates for admission to the bar.
69. In addition, of course, to reciprocity.
70. Cf. Schware, note 3 supra.
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its unique historical development and, perhaps, the relatively small
size of the state bar. Wisconsin is fortunate in that for decades two
strong law departments of the state's leading public and private
universities have consistently more than lived up to the responsibil-
ity accorded them under the diploma requirement. The faculties of
the state's two law schools are well aware of the diploma require-
ment's tradition and their duty to the bench, bar and citizens of
Wisconsin under it. While in some states the abolition of bar exam-
inations would be a backward step, throwing out diploma require-
ment in Wisconsin would be equally regressive.
As long as, in the considered opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, the diploma requirement serves the courts, bar and public
it should be kept. This does not mean that its existence should
never be questioned and perhaps a full scale evaluation would be
warranted as has been suggested. 71
Commitment to the diploma requirement need not be an emo-
tional one and should it prove a disservice it should be abandoned.
It appears, however, that for the past century it has served its
purpose well.
RICHARD A. STACK, JR.
71. See note 46, supra at 17-18.
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